infantile raciality

Barack Obama has delivered the great race speech of 2008. One pundit (Sally Quinn) declared on MSNBC that Obama's speech was the most important contribution to racial dialogue since M. L. King Jr.'s "I have a dream" speech of 1963. Obama, as usual, did weave together personal narrative with political and social dilemmas, and sounded the community organizer's call for Oneness in the face of a more powerful Other: corporations, lobbyists, terrorists, and the disembodied threat of ecological catastrophe. The most striking element, however, was his effort to work through the psychological issue of anger on both sides of the racial divide. More Oprah than Dr. Phil, Obama situates himself as a vessel of, and agent for, racial healing; as an exemplary person for extraordinary times. The religious (in the Durkheimian sense) dimension of Obama's candidacy is no less palpable than the materialist (in the Marxist sense) opposition that arises from the Clinton campaign. The choice is clear: the mission of national renewal versus the fight for redistributive policies within a recessionary capitalist market.

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The boldest implication of Obama's speech is that his candidacy offers the possibility of mass psychoanalysis, a therapeutic treatment for America's infantile raciality. The ressentiment of the dispossessed, referencing concrete hurts and frustrations, seeks out -- in an animistic style of thought -- invisible forces in the social world which are perceived to be the source of dispossession. Race is just such a force, a malevolent god or spirit that works to thwart (or facilitate) the pleasure of specific groups, that is, the satisfaction of needs that are both physical and emotional: material wealth and social recognition (i.e., status honour). To race is attributed an amazing capacity of creation of groups, motives and consequences of action; success and failure is legitimated or disqualified by this idea. This is no less a miracle than the transubstantiation accomplished during the Catholic communion: blessed wine and wafers become the blood and body of Christ; different degrees of melanin function as a cosmological explanation of reality, the invisible yet visible hand shaping individual fate. What Obama suggests is no less radical than the Copernican turn in Western science: geocentrism and raciocentrism can be replaced through a shift in perspective. However, like ressentiment for the Father's disposession of the son's unmediated access to the Mother, it is not easy to give up racial anger; hence, sexual development and social development is "arrested" or, more properly stated, fixated in an anal stage, an infantile stage. Pain and anger become substitutes for the lost Mother or forestalled social achievements, they become the object-cathexis of the resentful child and the resentful adult. It is as if the child-adult or adult-child says you've taken away what I should have by right, so this is all I have left, my anger, my suffering, and I won't let that be taken away. This anger is mine and you can't have it! 

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Whether a public official can facilitate this working through of past pain is uncertain (Mandela comes to mind as one such person whose success in this area -- in South Africa -- remains uncertain). The cause remains noble even if a tragic mode of emplotment seems the likely outcome of the story. This is the risky path Obama has chosen, however: to stand for a missionary purpose while needing to engage in mundane worldly activities. Obama's candidacy stands as a sort of test of Durkheim and Weber: are the sacred and profane radically opposed (Durkheim) or can an affinity exist between other-worldly (in the sense of transcendent) goals and this-worldly intensive activity. 

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art object credit: The Great Chain of Being from Rhetorica Christiana by Didacus Valades, 1579

through thick and thin

Stanley Fish has weighed in on the politics of identity that has surfaced in the Democratic campaign. He makes the usual distinction between what could be called "thick" and "thin" identity politics.

We should distinguish, I think, between two forms of identity politics. The first I have already named "tribal"; it is the politics based on who a candidate is rather than on what he or she believes or argues for. And that, I agree, is usually a bad idea. (I say "usually" because it is possible to argue that the election of a black or female president, no matter what his or [her] positions happen to be, will be more than a symbolic correction of the errors that have marred the country's history, and an important international statement as well.). The second form of identity politics is what I call "interest" identity politics. It is based on the assumption (itself resting on history and observation) that because of his or her race or ethnicity or gender a candidate might pursue an agenda that would advance the interests a voter is committed to. Not only is there nothing wrong with such a calculation -- it is both rational and considered -- I don't see that there is an alternative to voting on the basis of interest.

In this formulation, tribal identity politics is thick; interest identity politics is thin, or at least is purported to be by Professor Fish, who opposes what could be called the "cosmopolitan" position (represented by Stanley Crouch).

The alternative usually put forward is Crouch's: Vote "for human qualities" rather than sectarian qualities. That is, vote on the basis of reasons everyone, no matter what his or her identity, will acknowledge as worthy. But there are no such reasons and no such human qualities. To be sure, there are words often attached to this chimera -- integrity, dedication, honesty, intellect, to name a few. But these qualities, even when they are found, will always be in the service of some set of policies you either favor or reject. It is those policies, not the probity of the proposer, that you will be voting for. (If your candidate is also a good person, that's a nice bonus, but it isn't the essential thing.). You will be voting, in short, or interests, and those who don not have an investment in those interests will be voting for someone else.

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There is an obvious leap in Fish's argument, from identity politics qua interests to interest politics qua interests, which I'll return to in a bit. First, however, does the distinction between thick and thin political identity claims make theoretical and/or empirical sense? Liberalism (in the sense of political theory) assumes thin identity (at best). Reason, the rule of law, consensus on matters of general interest, and other such abstractions are presumed to guide the actions of participants in democratic processes. Unfortunately, such socially dense things like nationalism, racialism, patriarchalism, and the like have led to the formation of political identities in liberal regimes that are much thicker than water. Hence, theory is not predictive of practice and practice has deviated from theory. This does not mean the theory must be abandoned. What needs to be abandoned is the notion that liberal political regimes make no identity claims for or upon their citizens. Liberalism is very thick; it cannot be excluded from the category of a comprehensive worldview (Rawls). There is nothing wrong with this; but it does mean the "universalism" of liberalism's universal claims must be placed in relation to the social morphology of the regions in which it was first imposed at the point of bayonets and in which it flourishes now as a self-evident reality. In other words, there is nothing thin about liberalism, despite the fact that the insitutitionalization of liberal values has tended towards Weber's rational bureaucratic ideal type, which functions without regard to persons.

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What this means is that Fish's distinction is fallacious before the fact. However, his distinction can be criticized on its own terms. There is really no difference in 'motivation' in the person who (in Fish's terms) votes on the basis of tribalism or on the basis of identity interests: the assumption is that the candidate who mirrors one's own physique or ethnic group will best serve one's interests. Fish rightly makes what I would call the Nelson Mandela exception (since Fish is speaking abstractly): the vote for a person whose identity "will be more than a symbolic correction of errors that have marred the country's history, and an important international statement as well." Except this exception is exceptional: Mandela was both an exemplary figure and a politician with policy positions that were worth supporting. (It is worth noting that there are no Mandelas in this contest between Clinton and Obama). Leaving this exception aside: there is no rational reason to believe people who look like us will necessarily do things in our interests; conversely, there is no rational reason to believe people who don't look like us will necessarily do things to harm our interests. If the use of the term "interests" is not treated psychoanalytically, as largely unconscious (and I think Fish is using interests in the typical way in which it is connected to rationality), then neither thick tribalism nor thin identity interest politics can count as rational motivations or reasons. Hence, the only "rational reasons" that can be deduced must be those identified by Crouch, abstract qualities that individuals, not groups, claim to possess. Interest politics then only makes sense (assuming rationality) if individual identity and not group identity matters, that is, if the motivational basis for voting centers on the individuality of a candidate.  This is why Fish's "leap" makes no sense whatsoever. (Rationality is another assumption that can also be criticized: political action involves a large dose of belief that knows no reasons, which is simply outside Fish's conception of the vicissitudes of identity politics).

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One could ask why do "identity politics" provoke a visceral reaction among many people, including me. First, because it's not fun to be subject to the claims of authenticity that are a necessary component of identity politics. This Leninism (yes, I used that word) of the post-Marxist cultural left is really a political and ethical dead-end, since no amount of purges or corrections of "errors and deviations" through the confessional mode so popular in some cultural studies circles can ever guarantee the sanctity of the group claim. This has nothing to do with so-called "PC", which is a figment of the conservative imagination; it has to do with avant-gardism with respect to identity claims. If one has seen this in action, as I have in feminist circles at the University of Chicago during the late 80s, then Fish's appeal to identity politics will seem hopelessly naive. (To be fair, I assume Fish is not ignorant of the bad old 1980s and has a different model in mind). Second, if one takes a less personal, more historical perspective, especially one that recalls the existential difficulties that arose during the wars of religion of the 16th-17th centuries, then this widened referential set serves as a good warning against the promotion of identity, of strong or weak tribalism, and the easy dismissal of the cosmopolitan alternative. 

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It is the nature of democracy that citizens may vote for candidates for whatever reason. (These reasons are open to criticism even if the outcome of the voting is procedurally legitimate). Nonetheless, candidates should give voters something to aspire to, something beyond "getting mine", which is what American democracy does best for those who are good at getting it. If that means sacred identities will be scrutinized, so be it. This scrutiny is short-circuited in Fish's Op-Ed.

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Photo Credit: (New York Times) Stanley Fish